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In diesem Beitrag beschreiben wir aus linguistischer 
Perspektive das Verhältnis von einigen grammatischen 
Kategorien des Satzes (Realis) und der Nominalphrase 
(Definitheit, Spezifizität) im Hinblick auf den Status ihrer 
Referenten in der Diskurswelt, und überlegen 
anschliessend die ontologische Signifikanz der 
linguistischen Fakten. Unser Zugang unterscheidet sich 
in drei wichtigen Hinsichten von vorliegenden Arbeiten. 
Wir bieten erstens eine Erklärung für die symmetrischen 
und anti-symmetrischen (invers symmetrischen) 
Beziehungen, die zwischen Realis (bzw. Irrealis) und 
Definitheit (bzw. Indefinitheit) bestehen. Zweitens 
zeigen wir, dass keine Erklärung dieser Beziehungen 
ohne den Einbezug der grammatischen Kategorie der 
Spezifizität auskommen kann. Schliesslich untersuchen 
wir, in welchem Mass die inferentiellen Aspekte der 
linguistischen Symmetrien und Anti-Symmetrien 
ontologisch relevant sind, welche Schwierigkeiten sie für 
das ontologische Standardverständnis von Possibilia 
aufwerfen, und zeigen, dass eine Ontologie, die mit 
dynamischen und unbestimmt lokalisierten Individuen 
verfährt, den linguistischen Daten offenbar besser 
gerecht wird. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The linguistic literature of the last couple of decades contains several 
observations concerning morphological or semantic similarities between 
(markers of) mood and definiteness.1 Some attempts have been made to account 
for these similarities, but in our view these attempts are all flawed in that they 
(a) focus on symmetrical relationships between grammatical categories in the 
clause and in the noun phrase, i.e. they largely ignore the systematic 
dissimilarities or inverse symmetries (which we call here ‘anti-symmetries’ for 
short), and (b) fail to properly distinguish between definite/indefinite reference 
on the one hand and specific/nonspecific reference on the other. In this 
contribution we deal with both symmetrical and anti-symmetrical relationships 
between mood and definiteness and contend that any account of these 
relationships is incomplete without acknowledging the crucial role of specificity. 
As to symmetry, it is argued that the categories ‘realis’ and ‘irrealis’ at the level of 
the clause are similar to the categories ‘definite’ and ‘nonspecific-indefinite’ at 
the level of the noun phrase. ‘Realis’ and ‘definite’ indicate that the entity 
(thing, event) is ‘grounded’ in the world of discourse. By contrast, ‘irrealis’ and 
‘nonspecific-indefinite’ signal that the entity (thing, event) does not have a 
location (is not ‘grounded’) in the world of discourse. There are thus two 
symmetries, one linking the grammatical categories realis and definiteness, the 
other linking irrealis and nonspecific-indefiniteness. 
There is also an interesting anti-symmetry between (in)definiteness and (ir)realis 
(Rijkhoff 1988), which has to do with the number of ways that an entity can be 
definite (thing) or less than completely actual (event). Here definite aligns with 
irrealis in that both definite things (referents of definite noun phrases) and non-
actual events (referents of irrealis clauses) can occur in the world of discourse for 
many different reasons. By contrast, referents of specific-indefinite noun phrases 
and referents of realis clauses exist in the world of discourse for one and the 
same reason: because they ‘ground’ themselves in the world of discourse when 
they are being referred to for the first time. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses parallels between the 
structure of the noun phrase (NP) and the structure of the clause; evidence for 
parallels between the semantic (layered) structure of the noun phrase and the 
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clause is offered in section 3. Section 4 is concerned with the categories (ir)realis 
and (in)definiteness. Similarities between (ir)realis mood and (in)definiteness are 
the topic of section 5, whereas the differences are dealt with in section 6. Section 
7 shows that symmetrical as well as anti-symmetrical relations between mood 
and definiteness can only be explained if we bring into the discussion another 
grammatical category of the NP: specificity. Sections 8-11 discuss the 
philosophical implications of our observations and show that process 
ontological theories are better equipped to deal with symmetries and anti-
symmetries between things and events than substance based ontologies.2 
2. PARALLELS BETWEEN NPS AND SENTENCES 
Both in functional and formal theories of grammar it has been argued that NPs 
and clauses can be analyzed in a similar fashion. Whereas formal frameworks are 
concerned with similarities in the syntactic structure of NPs and clauses, 
functional theories have focused on parallels between semantic representations 
of these linguistic units. In the framework of Functional Grammar (Dik 1997) 
such parallels were first discussed in Rijkhoff (1988) and they will be briefly 
presented below (for a more elaborate presentation the reader is referred to 
Rijkhoff 2002). 
2.1. Descriptive modifiers 
Modifiers in the noun phrase and in the clause can be divided in two major 
types: descriptive and interpersonal modifiers. Descriptive modifiers specify 
properties of the referent of the NP in terms of quality, quantity and location 
(but see note 4). By contrast, interpersonal or ‘discourse’ modifiers (discussed in 
section 1.2.) pertain to ‘that it is’, i.e. they are concerned with the referential 
status of entities (objects, events) in the shared world of discourse (±Grounded).3 
The distinction between descriptive and interpersonal modifiers reflects the 
double function of NPs and clauses: on the one hand they provide a physical 
description of an entity (thing, event) and on the other hand they are 
constructions that speakers use to refer to an entity. 
There are three descriptive layers of modification, each of which has slots for 
grammatical and lexical modifiers (Figure 1).4 Adnominal adjectives, possessives 
and relative clauses are examples of lexical modifiers or ‘satellites’, because they 
involve members of lexical categories (verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs). 
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Operator slots are reserved for grammatical (i.e. non-lexical) modifiers which can 
be expressed as free forms (e.g. articles, demonstratives) or by inflectional 
morphology (e.g. definiteness, number, tense, aspect, mood, illocutionary force). 
 
Figure 1. Symmetry in the underlying structure of the clause and the NP: descriptive 
modifiers 
The quality layer contains the head (noun, verb) and accommodates modifiers 
that only relate to the property that is designated by the head (qualifying 
modifiers), such as nominal or verbal aspect markers, (typically) adjectives (if a 
language has them), and adverb(ial)s of manner or speed. The quantity layer 
contains the quality layer and accommodates modifiers (quantifying modifiers) 
having to do with number distinctions (singular, plural) or cardinality. The 
location layer contains both the quality layer and the quantity layer and 
accommodates modifiers specifying properties concerning the location of the 
thing or event (localizing modifiers), such as demonstratives, tense markers, 
relative clauses, adverb(ial)s such as in the garden, yesterday. 
For example, in the NP those two black dogs on the carpet the qualifying modifier 
black only relates to the noun dog, not the quantity or the location. The 
quantifying modifier two specifies the number of black dog entities, not the 
number of locations; and both those and on the carpet specify the location of the 
dog entities with all their qualitative and quantitative properties. 
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Languages use only a subset of the modifier categories mentioned in Figure 1 
and it must be emphasized that there is no one-to-one relationship between the 
form and the function of a modifier. We shall see below, for example, that 
demonstratives can also serve as interpersonal operators and that relative clauses 
can be employed as qualifying, quantifying or localizing satellites. 
2.2. Interpersonal or discourse modifiers 
In addition to the various descriptive layers, the underlying structures of the 
clause and the NP contain a single layer to accommodate modifiers that are 
concerned with the status of the thing or event as a discourse entity 
(interpersonal modifiers). Here we find markers of ±definiteness, ±specificity; 
±realis (actual/non-actual), modifiers/adverb(ial)s such as same, other, really, and 
actually. In the layered model of the clause and of the NP, interpersonal 
modifiers appear in the outermost layer, as they have all descriptive modifiers in 
their scope (Figure 2): 
 
Figure 2. Symmetry in the underlying structure of the clause and the NP: 
interpersonal modifiers 
3. EVIDENCE FOR THE LAYERED STRUCTURE 
The layered model presented above is supported by various kinds of data. Here 
we will briefly mention evidence from morphosyntax, parts-of-speech systems, 
historical linguistics, and cognitive linguistics. 
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3.1. Morphosyntax 
Logically, there are 24 possible ways to linearize a noun, a demonstrative, 
numeral, and an adjective in the noun phrase, but not every possible 
combination occurs in the languages of the world. Interestingly there are no 
gaps in the eight ‘iconic’ combinations, i.e. patterns that reflect the layered 
organization of the NP presented above (with the adjective always next to the 
noun and the demonstrative always in the periphery; see Rijkhoff 2004): 
(1) Iconic patterns Languages 
dem num A N Alamblak, Dutch, Georgian, Hungarian, Kayardild, Ket, 
Nama Hottentot, Imbabura Quechua, Pipil, Tamil, 
Turkish 
dem num N A Burushaski, Guaraní (also e.g. French and other 
Romance languages) 
dem A N num Zande 
dem N A num Bambara 
num A N dem Berbice Dutch Creole, Bislama, Sranan 
num N A dem Basque, Hmong Njua 
A N num dem Sango 
N A num dem Oromo, Fa d'Ambu, Nubi 
 
By contrast, languages that employ one of the remaining 16 non-iconic patterns 
as the basic order seem to be extremely rare. 
(2) Non–iconic patterns 
num A dem N 
A num dem N 
A dem num N 
dem A num N 
A num N dem 
num dem N A 
A dem N num 
num dem A N 
dem N num A 
num N dem A 
A N dem num 
N num A dem 
N dem num A 
N num dem A 
N A dem num 
N dem A num 
 
Greenberg (1966: 86-87) already mentioned that there is a clear preference for 
the iconic patterns: 
Universal 20 
When any or all of the items (demonstrative, 
numeral, and descriptive adjective) precede the noun, 
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they are always found in that order. If they follow, 
the order is either the same or its exact opposite. 
The reason Greenberg had to allow for a non-iconic pattern at all was actually 
due to one language in his sample, Kikuyu, which has the order [N dem num A]. 
According to Seiler (1978: 322), however, this is a “less popular variant” in 
Kikuyu, the normal order being [N A num dem]. 
Hawkins (1983), whose sample contained over 300 languages, mentioned two 
other Bantu languages with a non-iconic basic pattern in the NP: Aghem [N A 
dem num] and Noni (which has [N dem num A] as well as [N dem A num]), 
both spoken in Cameroon. Consequently Hawkins (1983: 119-120) reformulated 
Greenberg’s Universal 20 as follows:5 
Universal 20’ 
When any or all of the items (demonstrative, 
numeral, and descriptive adjective) precede the noun, 
they (i.e., those that do precede) are always found in 
that order. For those that follow, no predictions are 
made, though the most frequent order is the mirror-
image of the order for preceding modifiers. In no case 
does the adjective precede the head when the 
demonstrative or numeral follow. 
Thus, whereas each iconic pattern is employed as the basic order in at least one 
of the world’s languages, only a small fraction of the 16 non-iconic orders has 
been found so far. It remains to be seen, however, if we are really dealing with 
integral NPs in the case of Kikuyu, Aghem and Noni (see Rijkhoff 2002: 272-276 
for some arguments to show that we may not be dealing with simple integral 
NPs in the case of non-iconic patterns). 
There is also evidence from morphology and clause internal syntax to support 
the layered model (Figure 1). In English, for example, different kinds of temporal 
satellites tend to occur in the order time duration (for a short while = qualifying 
satellite), time frequency (every day or so = quantifying satellite) and time 
position (in January = localizing satellite), as in (Quirk et al. 1985: 551): 
(3) I was there for a short while every day or so in January 
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In her 1985 monograph on morphology, Bybee (1985: 196) investigated the 
ordering of inflectional morphemes relative to the verb in a representative 
sample of fifty languages. She found that ”[...] aspect occurs closest to the stem, 
followed by tense, and then by mood. The only exception to this ordering found 
in the 50-language sample is in Ojibwa, where the Dubitative suffix precedes the 
Preterite suffix.” 
3.2. Diachronic connections 
There is also historical evidence to support a parallel analysis in the layered 
representation of the clause and the noun phrase. For example, Gildea (1993) 
has shown how demonstratives have developed into tense markers in Panare 
(both: ‘location’). Several studies have remarked on phonological similarities 
between markers of nominal and verbal plurality (both: ‘quantity’ – cf. 
Frajzyngier 1977, 1997; Mithun 1988; Newman 1990) and von Garnier discussed 
historical connections between markers of collectivity and perfectivity (both: 
‘quality’) as early as 1909 (von Garnier 1909). 
3.3. Metaphor 
An obvious question to ask in this context is why there should be parallels 
between the underlying semantic structure of the NP and clause in the first place 
(see also sections 8-11). Basically there are four possible answers to this question: 
1. Clause structure is derived from NP structure; 
2. NP structure is derived from clause structure; 
3. NP structure and clause structure are due to a single cognitive procedure 
that deals with spatio-temporal entities; 
4. any similarities are due to chance (zero hypothesis). 
 
Currently the first possibility has the best empirical foundation. Although 
relatively little is known about the way the human cognitive system processes 
spatial and temporal entities, linguistic evidence indicates that our conceptual 
system is largely metaphorical in nature (Lakoff 1987). Since there are many 
examples which show that spatial metaphors are used to express temporal and 
other non-spatial notions, it is assumed that spatial conception plays a 
fundamental role in human cognition (Lyons 1977: 718; Claudi & Heine 1986; 
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Levinson 1992; Heine 1997; Haspelmath 1997). Thus perhaps it is because 
temporal entities are understood in terms of (cognitively less complex) spatial 
entities that NPs and clauses can be analyzed in a similar fashion (this 
assumption may, however, reflect a eurocentric perspective – see the Koasati 
example in note 7 below). 
It is perhaps good to point out that the time-is-like-space metaphor does not 
necessarily imply that operators of the noun develop into operators of the verb 
(as suggested by Newman 1990: 118 in the case of quantifying operators in 
Chadic).6 Rather it seems that operators of the noun and the clause both 
originate from a spatial element outside the NP proper. For example, the Panare 
tense marker mentioned above developed from a free demonstrative pronoun 
and is has been argued repeatedly that the free demonstrative pronoun is also 
the diachronic source for the adnominal demonstrative pronoun (McCool 1984, 
1993; Lehmann 1995: 37-39; Moravcsik 1997: 319). 
3.4. Isomorphism I: lexical modifiers in the NP and in the clause 
Languages across the globe employ various kinds of parts-of-speech systems 
(Figure 3). When we restrict ourselves to lexical word classes, we find, for 
example, that some languages have one major word class (Type 1 – Samoan), 
whereas other have several (Type 4 – e.g. Hungarian). 
Type 1 contentive 
Type 2 verb non-verb 
Flexible 
parts-of-speech 
systems Type 3 verb noun modifier 
Type 4 verb noun adjective adverb 
Type 5 verb noun adjective 




Type 7 verb 
 
Figure 3. Hengeveld's parts-of-speech system (adverb = manner adverb; based on 
Hengeveld, Rijkhoff and Siewierska 2004) 
Apart from quantitative differences in their parts-of-speech systems (number of 
word classes), languages may also differ with respect to the degree of flexibility 
displayed by the members of a certain word class. For example, in English the 
adjective beautiful needs to be provided with an adverbializing suffix -ly before it 
can modify a verb: 
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(4) She recorded a beautiful song 
(5) She sang beautifully 
 
But there are also languages, such as Ngiti (Type 3), which do not distinguish 
between adjectives and (manner) adverbs; i.e. Ngiti has a single class of flexible 
items (‘modifiers’) that can be used to modify verbs or nouns (Kutsch Lojenga 
1994: 336): 
“There is no morphological nor a clear syntactic 
distinction between a class of adjectives and a class of 
adverbs in Ngiti. The functional term modifiers is 
therefore used [...] to cover a fairly large grammatical 
class of words, containing about 150 items, which are 
neither nouns nor verbs and which all have a 
modifying function in relation to different 
constituents.” 
Ngiti (Kutsch Lojenga 1992: 338) 
(6) ngbángba nítdù  isNÂ ànNÁ 
 ngbángba ní -ìtdù isNÂ ànNÁ 
 child RSM -carry:PF.PR light load 
 ‘The child carried a light load’ 
 
(7) isNÂ ngbángba nítdù  ànNÁ 
 isNÂ ngbángba ní -ìtdù ànNÁ 
 light child RSM -carry:PF.PR load 
 ‘The child carried the load easily’ 
 
In other words, Ngiti and other languages of Type 3 the same element is used as 
a qualifying modifier (‘quality satellite’) in the NP and in the clause. 
3.5. Isomorphism II: grammatical modifiers in the NP and in the clause 
It was already mentioned in section 3.2 that there is a strong resemblance 
between quantifying operators in the NP and the clause in certain languages. 
The same goes for operators at the interpersonal level. Compare, for example, 
the ‘multifunctional determiners’ in Haitian Creole and Fongbe (a Kwa language 
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mainly spoken in Benin and one of the substratum languages of Haitian 
Creole):7 
Haitian Creole and Fongbe (Lefebvre 1998: 94, 99) 
(8) a. Haitian M manje krab la 
 b. Fongbe N Öú àsNÂn NÂ 
  I eat crab DET 
  ‘I ate the crab (in question/that we know of)’ 
 
(9) a. Haitian Jan rive a 
 b. Fongbe Jan wá NÂ 
  John arrive DET 
  ‘Actually, John arrived’ 
 
4. MOOD AND DEFINITENESS 
Having dealt with the preliminaries, we can now begin our discussion of the 
main topic of this paper: the relationship between interpersonal operators mood 
and definiteness (and ultimately: specificness). Formal evidence for a 
relationship between definiteness and (realis) mood was already provided in the 
previous section (see examples (8) and (9) from Fongbe and Haitian Creole; see 
also examples (29) and (30) from Jacaltec below). 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 briefly discuss the categories (ir)realis and (in)definiteness. 
Similarities between (i) ‘realis’ and ‘definite’ and (ii) ‘irrealis’ and ‘indefinite’ will 
be explored in section 4.3. The anti-symmetrical relationship between 
interpersonal operators of the NP and the clause is the topic of section 5, which 
brings into the discussion another grammatical category of the NP: specificity.8 
4.1. Realis and irrealis mood 
An event that is being referred to may be actual (or ‘real’ in the sense of ‘having 
been initiated’ or ‘having occurred’ in the world) or non-actual (‘irreal’). Events 
may be perceived as non-actual for different reasons; for example, because the 
speaker expresses a wish or a request: 
(10) I wish you were here [interlocutors are not in the same place] 
JAN RIJKHOFF AND JOHANNA SEIBT 
 96
(11) Would you please close the door? [the door is not closed] 
 
In both cases the speaker refers to an event that has not happened (yet) and 
which therefore cannot be located at a particular spatio-temporal region in the 
world.9 
All languages seem to have linguistic devices to mark the various kinds of moods 
(e.g. epistemic, deontic) and speech acts (e.g. indicative, imperative, optative) 
that signal in a more or less indirect fashion to the addressee whether or not 
reference is being made to an actual event.10 There are, however, quite a few 
languages that (also) employ a special realis or irrealis marker to indicate 
whether or not the event referred to is to be regarded as actual or non-actual. 
Elliott (2000: 68-70) mentions four broad contexts in which such a marker tends 
to appear: (i) potential events, (ii) events whose occurrence is dependent on 
certain conditions being fulfilled (conditionals), including counterfactuals, (iii) 
events which are qualified by modality, and (iv) commands. In addition she 
mentions three other semantic contexts where a special irrealis marker may 
occur: (v) negation, (vi) habituals, and (vii) interrogatives. The following 
examples from the Papuan language Amele illustrate. 





























 ‘They will kill the pig as it runs out’ 
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 ‘They would/should have killed the pig as it ran out’ 
 
4.2. Definiteness and indefiniteness 
There is no shortage of semantic, pragmatic or cognitive accounts of the 
grammatical categories definiteness and indefiniteness (see e.g. Hawkins 1978, 
Lyons 1999, Epstein 2002). The vast literature on the subject shows, among 
other things, that opinions differ as to whether definiteness is explained best in 
terms of identifiability, familiarity or accessibility. We will not defend any 
particular position here; our main point is to show that (at some level of 
abstraction) the notions definiteness and indefiniteness can be compared to the 
notions realis and irrealis in that both pairs have to do with the pragmatic status 
of the referent (thing, event) in the world of discourse. For this reason it will 
suffice to mention the contexts in which definite NPs are commonly used. 
Definite NPs are perhaps most typically used when reference is made to an entity 
that is already available in world of discourse and which has been mentioned 
not long before (anaphoric use), as in: 
(19) I just bought a book and a calendar. Surprisingly, the book was much cheaper 
than the calendar 
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Definite NPs are also typically used when the referent is available in the physical 
context (situational or deictic use). 
(20) Now tell me – what do you see on the monitor? 
 
Referents of NPs can also be deemed identifiable (or accessible) by the speaker 
because of so-called ‘bridging-cross-reference’ (associative use). 
(21) I took a taxi from the station. On the way the driver told me there was a bus 
strike 
 
Another well known context that licenses the use of a definite NP is when 
reference is made to an entity which is not directly available in the linguistic or 
non-linguistic context but which is relatively unique in the given contextual 
setting and which the hearer can often identify on the basis of his or her general 
knowledge. An example of this is the station in (21); here is another example: 
(22) The moon was very bright last night 
 
Compare with: 
(23) *The star was very bright last night 
 
Indefinite NPs, on the other hand, are used to refer to entities that are not 
deemed identifiable for the addressee, usually because they have not been 
properly introduced in the world of discourse (as is the case with all indefinite 
NPs in the examples above). 
5. REALIS AND DEFINITENESS: SIMILARITIES 
In the layered representation of the NP and the clause (Figure 2) the categories 
realis/irrealis and definite/indefinite are represented at the interpersonal level, as 
both are concerned with the pragmatic status of a referent (thing, event) in the 
shared world of discourse. By marking an event as real (or actual) or by marking 
a thing as definite, the speaker indicates to the addressee that the event or thing 
referred to (already) has a place in the world of discourse. Conversely, marking 
an event as unreal (or non-actual) or marking a thing as indefinite is an 
MOOD, DEFINITENESS AND SPECIFICITY: A LINGUISTIC AND A PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF THEIR 
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
 99
indication for the addressee that the event or thing does not (yet) have a proper 
place in the world of discourse.11 In the case of a thing the hearer should 
interpret the indefiniteness marker as an instruction to construct a new spatial 
entity as a discourse referent. The irrealis marker also instructs the addressee to 
construe a new entity as a discourse referent (in this case a temporal entity: an 
event), but in addition the irrealis marker tells the addressee that the event must 
not be ‘grounded’ or ‘anchored’ as a real event in the world of discourse. 
There are thus two symmetries, one linking Realis and Definiteness, the other 
linking Irrealis and Indefiniteness. 





THING OR EVENT (ALREADY) HAS A 






THING OR EVENT DOES NOT HAVE A 





Figure 4. Symmetry between Definite/Realis and Indefinite/Irrealis 
6. REALIS AND DEFINITENESS: DIFFERENCES 
There is also an interesting anti-symmetry between NPs and clauses which may 
point to a fundamental difference between first and second order (spatial and 
temporal) entities (Rijkhoff 1988: 25).12 We saw in section 4.2 that there are 
many reasons why the speaker may assume the referent of a definite NP to be 
recoverable for the hearer (anaphoric reference, deictic reference, etc.), but that 
there is basically only one way for an event to be actual: because it (has) 
occurred or is occurring. And vice versa: while there is basically one reason why 
the speaker assumes the referent of an indefinite NP to be irretrievable (because 
its referent is unidentifiable / unfamiliar / inaccessible), there are numerous 
reasons why an event can be non-actual. For example, because the speaker 
expresses a desire, a wish, a hope, a fear, an intention, a possibility, a probability, 
a request, or a command (see examples 14-18 from Amele). 





NUMBER OF REASONS FOR 
BEING MARKED AS 
(IN)DEFINITE OR (IR)REAL 
Clause 
(event) 
Definite MANY ONE Realis 
Indefinite ONE MANY Irrealis 
 
Figure 5. Anti-symmetry between Definite/Realis and Indefinite/Irrealis 
7. MORE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOOD AND DEFINITENESS: THE 
ROLE OF ‘SPECIFICITY’ 
Sections 5 and 6 were concerned with symmetrical and anti-symmetrical 
relationships between (ir)realis mood and (in)definiteness. This section argues 
that we need another grammatical category of the NP so as to be able to give a 
more complete account of these (anti)symmetries: specificity. We will ignore the 
problem whether specificity is a subcategory of indefinite (the traditional view) 
or constitutes a separate mode of referring to entities (see note 8), since this issue 
does not affect the point we want to make: that specificity must play a crucial 
role in any account of the relationship between (ir)realis and (in)definiteness. 
Consider the following examples (Karttunen 1976): 
Specific-indefinite reference: 
(24) Max wants a dog. It is black 
 
Nonspecific-indefinite reference: 
(25) Max wants a dog. It must be black 
 
These examples show that there are two ways to continue the first sentence (Max 
wants a dog). The difference is due to the fact that in (24) reference is made to a 
specific dog (‘Max wants a certain dog, which is known to be black’), whereas in 
(25) the speaker does not refer to any particular dog (see von Heusinger 2002b 
for a recent discussion of the notion specificness). 
Before we continue, let us first return briefly to the realis/definiteness symmetry. 
Referents of clauses (events) and NPs (things) are both entities in the world of 
discourse created by the interlocutors. Many languages have special markers (e.g. 
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a realis affix as in examples 12-13, or a definite article as in examples 19-22) to 
indicate that an event or thing exists (or already existed) and has a certain 
location in the world of discourse (or that its existence and location can be 
explained). 
Definite NP, realis clause 
(26) I saw the movie in Amsterdam last week 
 
Since realis events and definite things are located in some spatio-temporal region 
in that world of discourse, these events and things can be said to be 
GROUNDED in that world of discourse. There is a difference, however, in that 
realis (tensed) events ground themselves upon being referred to by the speaker, 
whereas definite things often first need to be introduced by an indefinite NP 
before they can be grounded (hence the anti-symmetry). 
Referents of irrealis clauses (see examples 14-18) and nonspecific-indefinite NPs 
(as in 25) are events and things that also may be said to exist in some fashion 
once they have been mentioned (since it is possible to refer to them 
anaphorically), but they do not occupy a particular spatio-temporal region in 
the world of discourse – at least not yet (it is impossible to say where or when 
they are occurring or have occurred). In other words, irrealis events and 
nonspecific-indefinite things are NOT GROUNDED in the world of discourse.13 
This explains why tense marking (‘location in time’) is often obligatorily absent 
with certain modal distinctions. For instance, in Kobon “the tense distinctions 
between simple past, remote past, present, and future are made only in the 
indicative mood [...]” (Davies 1981: 168). However, non-actuality of an event 
does not necessarily mean that tense is always absent. When tense is used for a 
non-actual event, it specifies WHEN an event was non-actual. The following 
example from Nyigina (Australia) illustrates: 
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 ‘He didn’t go to Derby’ 
 
Referents of specific-indefinite NPs, on the other hand, are GROUNDED 
immediately in the world of discourse once they have been referred to by the 
speaker (see also 24).14 
Specific-indefinite reference: 
(28) The other day my daughter saw a puppy in a pet shop. Of course, she wanted to 
take it home right away 
 
In this sense referents of specific-indefinite NPs are like realis events in that they 
ground themselves (anti-symmetry).15 
Summing up, we can now say that SYMMETRY between (in)definiteness and 
(ir)realis is due to the fact that 
a) DEFINITE and REALIS indicate that the entity (thing, event) is grounded 
(occupies a certain spatio-temporal region) in the world of discourse, and 
b) NONSPECIFIC-INDEFINITE and IRREALIS indicate that the entity (thing, 
event) is not grounded (does not occupy a certain spatio-temporal region) 
in the world of discourse. 
 
 
Noun Phrase (thing) 
OCCURRENCE IN 
WORLD OF DISCOURSE 
Clause 
(event) 
Definite GROUNDED IN  
DISCOURSE WORLD 
Realis 




Figure 6. Symmetry between Definite/Realis and Nonspecific-indefinite/Irrealis 
In section 3.5 we saw that some languages use the same form to mark realis and 
definiteness (Fongbe, Haitian Creole). Jacaltec (Mayan) is an example of a 
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language that employs the same marker for irrealis and nonspecific-indefinite 
reference (variation due to vowel harmony):16 









 ‘Would that he slept!’ [exhortative mood] 















 ‘The women started looking for a pot’ [nonspecific reference] 
 
ANTI-SYMMETRY between (IN)DEFINITENESS and (IR)REALIS is due to the fact 
that 
a) referents of DEFINITE NPs and referents of IRREALIS clauses are part of 
the world of discourse for many different reasons; 
b) referents of SPECIFIC-INDEFINITE NPs and referents of REALIS clauses 
became part of the world of discourse for the same reason: because they 
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Figure 7. Anti-symmetry between Definite/Realis and Specific-indefinite/Irrealis 
8. ONTOLOGY AND COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE 
So far we have highlighted parallels in the semantic representations of NP and 
clause (sections 2-3) and identified symmetries and anti-symmetries obtaining 
among the grammatical categories (ir)realis, (in)definite, and (non)specific 
(sections 4-7). At this point quite naturally the question arises whether the 
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general insights and particular findings reported in the preceding sections can be 
accorded any significance from a cognitive point of view. 
It appears there are two routes into the investigation of cognitive structures. 
Besides empirical studies of factual cognitive processes there is theoretical 
inquiry into the range of possible organizations of cognitive domains, which is 
primarily conducted in an interdisciplinary research area where linguistics and 
philosophy, or more narrowly: philosophical ontology, overlap. Ontology is the 
philosophical discipline that devises descriptions of possible structures of the 
world we experience and speak about.17 
Since Aristotle ontologists have mainly preferred to take their cues from 
grammatical facts rather than from descriptions of allegedly ‘pure’ phenomenal 
experience. This longstanding methodological conviction that descriptions of 
conceptual structures should be guided by the analysis of linguistic structures 
received a strong impulse during the last century. Mainly due to the work of 
Alfred Tarski, Rudolf Carnap, and Richard Montague the “linguistic turn” (more 
a ‘return to language’) in ontology generated fertile research interactions 
between logic, analytical ontology, and linguistics. Model-theoretic semantics, 
or more generally, the project of assigning (structural descriptions of) 
denotations to (classes of) sentences, can be undertaken from a variety of 
viewpoints and with various theoretical goals. An ontological model theory 
furnishes assignments of formal structures to (classes of) sentences in order to 
justify the inferentially relevant part of a language L in terms of the structure of 
the ‘world of experience’ that L-speakers take themselves to talk about. In short, 
ontology investigates the cognitive (inference-guiding) structures we can 
attribute to our world of experience in order to understand why we speak and 
reason about the world the way we do. 
In the following four sections we will consider the cognitive implications of the 
preceding linguistic results from the point of view of analytical ontology. 
Generally speaking, we will be concerned with the question which of the various 
possible structural descriptions of the world of experience – i.e. the external, 
physical world that contains correlates for items in the speaker’s and hearer’s 
shared world of discourse – would best account for the stated linguistic results. 
Due to limitations of space we will confine ourselves to discussing two such 
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structural descriptions. After a brief discussion of the linguistic data in the 
remainder of this section we will in section 9 point at difficulties arising for any 
attempt of accommodating these data in an unmodified ‘standard possible world 
framework’. In sections 10 and 11 we motivate and sketch an alternative 
framework for the interpretation of modal sentences and indefinite NPs, a newly 
developed ontology called ‘General Process Theory’ (GPT). GPT contains the 
theoretical tools to define suitable cognitive structures that can (a) explain the 
parallels in the semantic representations of NP and clause, and (b) justify the 
various symmetries and anti-symmetries in the pragmatic status of denotations 
of (in)definite NPs and clauses in the (ir)realis as detailed above. 
Hereafter we will refer to the above noted linguistic Similarities and Differences 
in Mood and Definiteness by the acronym ‘SDMD’. Let us set out with the 
question whether the SDMD present ontological research with proper ‘data’, and 
if so, which aspects of the SDMD are relevant for ontological theory 
construction. 
To restate, in a rough and ready characterization, an ontology is a theory that 
explains how we reason in terms of what we can take ourselves to reason about. 
More precisely, the task of an ontology is to describe the structure of the 
referential domain of a language L in such a way that the inferential role of L-
sentences (in their discourse environment) is captured as fully as possible. In 
contrast to typical instances of model-theoretic semantics used in linguistics, an 
ontological theory aims to devise interpretations for L-sentences that are (in the 
linguistic sense) ‘typologically general’, i.e., that capture the inferential role of 
the sentence independent of its specific linguistic coding. In other words, while 
a linguistic semantics is typically developed for a single language, ontologists 
aspire to provide descriptive tools for the interpretation of any language. The 
intended universal scope of an ontology can be conveniently indicated by 
means of Sellarsian “dot-quotes”. A dot-quote term such as ‘•red•’ denotes 
distributively any expression that is functionally equivalent to the quoted 
expression. Thus we can state the following general characterization of an 
ontology: 
(ONT) In its perspicuous methodological form an ontological theory has 
the form of the quadruple 
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<M, TM, f, S = {•Si•}>. 
That is, an ontological theory defines (explicitly or implicitly) an 
assignment f that correlates the elements of a class S of dot-quoted L-
sentences (or L-discourse parts) with elements of the model structure M as 
described by a domain theory TM, such that f captures the (ontologically 
relevant part of the) inferential role of any •Si•. 
 
An assignment f captures the inferential role of a sentence •Si•, if the cognitive 
structure f(•Si•) (i.e., the element in the model structure M) entails the formal 
and the most general ‘material’ inferences licensed (relative to L) by S. For 
example, the ontological interpretation of ‘•this car is red•’ should entail the 
material inferences ‘•what is to the left of this car is not identical with this car•’ 
and ‘•it is not the case that what is to the left of this car is not identical with 
red•’. Material inferences at this level of generality are called ‘categorial 
inferences’. Thus, in analogy to common characterizations of logical theories as 
theories of formal inference in •L•, an ontological theory can be called a theory 
of the categorial inference in •L•.18 
This characterization of ontology goes beyond the more familiar portrayals of 
ontologies as “theories of truth-makers” – i.e., entities the existence and 
constellation of which ‘makes true’ the sentence of a language. The description 
we offer here has the advantage of indicating at once what kind of data 
ontological theories must account for, namely, the categorial inferences 
embedded in a language (understood as a representative of a functionally 
equivalent class of languages). 
Relative to the definition of ontology in (ONT) the question of whether the 
SDMD are ontologically relevant transforms into: ‘Are there categorial inferences 
contained in or connected with the SDMD?’ For the case of the similarities or 
symmetries between mood and definiteness this is rather obvious. Consider 
sentences (31) through (34): 
(31) Max sat down 
(32) Max would have sat down 
(33) Emma was looking for the cup 
(34) Emma wants a dog 
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Both (31) and (33) carry an existential presupposition: 
(35) There is an action that Max performed 
(36) There is a cup Emma is looking for19 
 
Similarly, (32) and (34) both fail to license analogous existential statements. In 
addition, both (32) and (34) entail negated identity statements: 
(37) Sitting down is not identical with the action Max performed then and there 
(38) What Emma wants is not identical with any specific dog 
 
If the latter two inferences strike one as somewhat trivial, then this is due to the 
– in itself far from trivial – fact that grammatical categories such as the ‘irrealis’ 
(e.g., the ‘counterfactual’) and ‘(non-specific) indefinite’ already are 
classifications of expressions relative to (the ontologically relevant part of) their 
inferential role. 
In the case of the anti-symmetry between realis and definiteness matters are 
quite similar. The inferential significance of the anti-symmetry surfaces via the 
associated symmetry of clauses in the irrealis and definite NPs: just as there are 
‘many reasons for being marked as definite, there are many reasons for being 
marked as irrealis’. This pragmatic similarity between definite NP and irrealis is 
reflected in an inferential similarity; consider: 
(39) Max V-ed the N (e.g.: Max moved the chair) 
(40) Max would have V-ed (e.g.: Max would have sat down) 
(41) The N V-ed by Max is something that can be re-encountered from different 
viewpoints 
(42) The V-ing by Max is identical with any future, desired, commanded, hoped for 
etc. V-ing by Max 
 
Sentences (41) and (42) both express that the denotation of the NP or clause, 
respectively, is something that can be re-encountered – either across discourse 
time or space as in (41), or across the varieties of modality, as in (42). These two 
inferences again closely reflect the meaning of the grammatical categories of 
‘definiteness’ and ‘irrealis’. Definiteness expresses that type of reidentifiablity 
that enables factual or possible re-encounters in time and space. Similarly, the 
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fact that the irrealis comprises many different modalities dovetails with the 
inference in (42) that the non-actual event denoted in (40) is cognitively stable 
across different varieties of non-actuality. The non-actuality of the event, (42) 
says, expresses that type of re-identifiability that enables identification across 
discourse contexts. 
The implications of the SDMD just highlighted as ontological data appear 
redundant since they reformulate aspects of the core meaning of the 
grammatical notions ‘(ir)realis’ and ‘(in)definite’. However, once the inferential 
anchoring and thus the ontological relevance of the grammatical categories of 
mood and definiteness as such has come into view, one can claim that even the 
more pragmatic aspects of the SDMD are – at least prima facie – ontologically 
relevant. Already the six categorial inferences highlighted above suffice to 
maintain that an adequate ontological interpretation of •L•-sentences should 
not only cover the inferential symmetries contained in the SDMD but should 
also explain, or be at least compatible with, the coding and grounding principles 
that involve the relevant grammatical categories. That is, an ontological theory 
should explain, or at least be compatible with, the following facts: 
E1) Inferential symmetries: 
E1.1) Clauses with definite NPs and clauses in the realis license existential 
generalizations. 
E1.2) Clauses with non-specific indefinite NPs and clauses in the irrealis, 
respectively, license negated identity statements involving the NP in its 
definite form and the clause in the realis, respectively. 
E1.3) Clauses with definite NPs and clauses in the irrealis, respectively, license 
identity statements across time and space or across modal contexts, 
respectively. 
 
E2) Coding principles: 
E2.1) An indefiniteness marker should be used when a NP is introduced into 
the discourse. 
E2.2) Indefiniteness markers can be used to denote grounded and ungrounded 
entities. 
 
E3) Grounding principles: 
E3.1) The realis and specific indefinite NPs ‘ground themselves’ in discourse 
directly, without sentential embedding or discourse embedding. 
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E3.2) There are many ways to ground an NP and many ways to ‘unground’ a 
sentence in discourse. 
 
9. A CRITICAL LOOK AT POSSIBLE WORLDS 
The refurbishment of Leibniz’s notion of a possible world for the purposes of 
modal logic and probability theory supplied 20th century analytical thought with 
one of its most important conceptual tools. Many of the most significant 
achievements of analytical ontology, philosophical logic, and formal semantics 
pertain to the modeling of reasoning in non-extensional contexts. Given the 
impressive versatility of the possible world approach, they present the most 
natural starting point for an inquiry into the ontological interpretation of the 
SDMD. 
For present purposes it will suffice to highlight four basic theoretical moves 
involved in the adoption of a ‘standard possible world semantics,’ i.e., of a 
possible world framework together with usual formal reconstruction of natural 
language expressions in standard predicate logic.21 
PW1) There is a (finite or infinite) set W containing the actual world w* and 
possible worlds wi: W = {w*, w1...wn}. Any world wi is a (maximal and 
consistent) set of state of affairs (or things exemplifying properties and 
relations). The members of W do not share any elements. 
PW2) The denotations of non-grounded NPs and sentences in the irrealis are 
either (i) possible entities (members of possible worlds) or else (ii) senses 
or intensions conceived of as functions from possible worlds into 
extensions. All and only sentences in the realis are true in the actual 
world. The denotations of grounded NPs are members of the actual world. 
PW3) The formal equivalent of linguistic indefiniteness (indefinite NPs) is 
existential quantification and predication. (For example, the formal 
analysis of Tom is riding a bicycle should be developed from the 
transformation There is something which is a bicycle and Tom is riding it). 
PW4) The formal equivalent of linguistic definiteness (definite NPs) is 
existential quantification plus a uniqueness condition. (For example, the 
formal analysis of the winner should be developed from the 
transformation There is an x which is a winner and for every y which is a 
winner it holds that y is identical with x). 
 
If to these principles one is prepared to add the assumption: 
PW5) The shared discourse world is the actual world w*, 
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a number of the SDMD-explananda (E1) through (E3) can be smoothly 
accommodated. For example, consider again: 
E1.2) Clauses with non-specific indefinite NPs and clauses in the irrealis, 
respectively, license negated identity statements involving the NP in its 
definite form and the clause in the realis, respectively. 
 
The difference between specific and non-specific indefinite NPs corresponds to 
the logician’s distinction of ‘de re’ and ‘de dicto’ readings of sentences with 
indefinite NP: 
(43) Max is looking for a bicycle 
 
De re reading: 
(43a) There is something which is a bicycle and Max is looking for it 
 
De dicto reading: 
(43b) Max is looking for something that satisfies the predicate ‘is a bicycle’ 
 
The indefinite NPs of sentences in the de dicto reading are taken to denote 
possible entities or intensions (i.e., properties, conceived of as sets of possible 
individuals, or functions from possible worlds into sets of actual individuals), 
just as sentences in the irrealis, see (PW2) denote possible entities or intensions 
(i.e. propositions, conceived of as sets of states of affairs, or functions from 
possible worlds into truth-values). Since there is no overlap between the actual 
and any possible world, the symmetric inference mentioned in (E1.2) holds: 
anything denoted by non-specific indefinite NPs and clauses in the irrealis will 
be non-identical with the denotations of grounded NPs and clauses in the realis 
(see PW2). 
On the basis of the postulate that specific indefinite NPs denote actual entities 
and non-specific indefinite NPs denote possible entities or intensions, the 
possible world approach also can straightforwardly motivate the NP-part of the 
grounding principle: 
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E3.1) The realis and specific indefinite NPs ‘ground themselves’ in discourse 
directly, without sentential embedding or discourse embedding. 
 
The groundedness of the realis follows directly from (PW2) together with the 
standard truth-condition for the realis. 
Furthermore, given the analysis of definiteness as existential generalization with 
uniqueness requirement, the coding principle: 
E2.1) An indefiniteness marker should be used when a NP is introduced into 
the discourse. 
 
makes good sense in a situation where uniqueness is not yet established (as well 
as the exceptions mentioned above, e.g., ‘the moon’ where uniqueness is 
presupposed). The same holds for the second coding principle: 
E2.2) Indefiniteness markers can be used to denote grounded and ungrounded 
entities. 
 
The possible world framework can accommodate this principle due to the fact 
that (i) indefinite NPs are represented by existentially quantified predicates (see 
PW3 above), and (ii) existential quantifiers are defined to range over entities in 
actual and possible worlds. 
While observations such as these suggest that the standard possible world 
framework could be used for an ontological interpretation of the SDMD, at least 
one of the SDMD-explananda strongly militates against such a strategy. Consider 
again: 
E1.1) Clauses with definite NPs and clauses in the realis license existential 
generalizations. 
 
The inferential symmetry of definite NPs and sentences in the realis at first 
glance seems to correlate well with the fact that the denotations of both are in 
the actual world – existential generalization over actual entities carries the sense 
of actual existence. However, this strong sense of existential generalization as 
‘there is in the actual world …’ would fit only existential generalizations licensed 
by a sentence in the realis. For definite NPs that intuitively denote non-actual 
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entities, the sense of existential generalization obviously cannot be ‘there is in 
the actual world’ and thus we lose the inferential symmetry in (E1.1). On the 
other hand, we cannot adopt the weak reading of existential generalization as 
‘there is in some world (actual or possible) …’ on pain of losing the contrast with 
ungrounded NPs (where existential generalization applies in this weak sense 
precisely). Consider: 
(44) Max searched the holy grail 
 
The NP in (44) is grounded in the discourse world yet intuitively should denote 
a possible entity or an intension, not a denizen of the actual world. It appears 
thus that the basic premise (PW5) must be abandoned: the shared discourse 
world, the world of grounded entities, cannot be equated with the actual world 
w* in the possible world framework. But then ‘all bets are off again’ with respect 
to the question whether and how any of the SDMD-explananda could be 
accommodated in a possible world framework. 
At this point the natural course of action might seem to embark on the task of 
investigating possible replacements for (PW5). But it is questionable whether 
this strategy would at all be worthwhile for the purposes of an ontological 
interpretation of the SDMD.22 So far we have bracketed the question whether the 
possible world framework is indeed a viable ontological approach. The possible 
world framework is unquestionably a versatile and useful conceptual tool for 
many tasks in formal semantics and philosophical logic. But however 
convenient ‘possible world talk’ might be as a rough-and-ready clarificatory 
idiom in these areas, from the ontologist’s point of view the conceptual 
foundations of the possible world framework seem unsatisfactory in at least two 
ways. 
First, if worlds are sets of states of affairs, they are – if we follow the common 
‘platonist’ interpretation of sets – curiously abstract, which does not sit well with 
the idea that the actual world is one of the possible worlds. The problem receives 
its particular bite in combination with the following antinomy.23 If each possible 
world is defined as a maximally consistent set of states of affairs w = {s1, …sn}, 
then for any state of affairs si consistent with the states of affairs in w it holds 
that si ∈ w. According to the power set axiom there are 2
n subsets of w. Among 
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these subsets there is the subset {s1, s2} and the subset {s3, s4}. But then there are 
states of affairs expressed by the statements s1 ∈ {s1, s2} and s1 ∉ {s3, s4}. Call these 
states of affairs s5 and s6. Obviously s5 and s6 are consistent with w and thus 
should be elements of w. Thus w is not maximal, which is in conflict with the 
original assumption. There are various ways in which this antinomy might be 
avoided. But they all require that one renounces the framework’s basic asset, 
namely, the postulate (PW1) that possible worlds are sets of states of affairs (in 
the sense defined by standard set theory where the power set axiom holds).24 
Second, the possible world idiom obscures difficulties in talking about possibilia. 
When we want to say that a state of affairs p is possible, we commonly express 
this with an existential quantification: 
(45) p is (merely) possible = there is a world w (which is not the actual world 
w*) and p is a member of w. 
◊ p = ∃w (p ∈ w) 
 
But the existential quantifier is standardly interpreted over actually existing 
objects. In other words, standard quantification is actually not comprehensive 
enough to reach into non-actual entities and worlds. This creates the following 
dilemma for an understanding of existence and existential quantification25: 
A) Assume that in the possible world framework quantification is understood 
in the usual way and existence as actual existence. This option has the 
advantage of retaining a reasonable concept of existence, but it does so at 
the expense of losing the distinction between actual and possible worlds: 
if the same quantifiers are taken to range over all worlds, and we 
understand existential quantification in the usual sense as ranging over 
actually existing entities, then possible worlds would exist as much or in 
the same sense as the actual world. 
B) Assume that in the possible world framework quantification is given a 
special interpretation, call it “possibilistic quantification”. Unlike 
standard quantifiers ‘possibilistic quantifiers’ range over possible entities. 
Here we can retain the distinction between actual and possible worlds, 
but at the expense of losing the familiar concept of quantification. 
Moreover, in defining ‘possibilistic quantification’ as quantification over 
possible entities, definitions of modal predicates and operators in a 
possible world framework would hardly be enlightening from the 
ontological point of view. 
 
In sum, while the possible world idiom affords a handy semantic tool to 
interpret modal reasoning in terms of set-theoretic structures, it is questionable 
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whether these structures can be given any ontological meaning and thus (cf. 
section 8) attributed any potential cognitive significance. One might opt to push 
these objections aside and search for suitable replacements for (PW5) above, 
relating the actual world and the discourse world in more sophisticated ways. 
However, we think it would seem more natural to react in the opposite way and 
take the framework’s failure vis-à-vis SDMD-explanandum (E1.1) as yet another 
reason to turn away from the possible world approach and explore other 
avenues for an ontological interpretation of the SDMD. 
10. POSSIBILISM, ACTUALISM, AND THE MYTH OF SUBSTANCE 
There are two basic strategies for an interpretation (semantic or ontological) of 
modal discourse. The possible world framework considered in the previous 
section implements the first strategy, which we call ‘possibilism or duplication 
variation’: 
Possibilism or Duplication Variation 
Statements about possible entities (events, state of affairs, individuals etc.) 
are made true by entities in deactualized variations of the actual situation 
or world (set of actual events, states of affairs, individuals etc.). So-called 
possible situations or worlds are sets of deactualized entities – the entities 
in these worlds are as determinate or ‘fully fleshed out’ as actual entities 
and merely lack the latters’ actuality. The variation scenarios called 
possible situations or worlds are – in conceptual space – juxtaposed to the 
actual situation or world. 
 
In contrast, some ontologists have championed the view that modal statements 
are actually made true by actual entities.26 This strategy of ‘actualism or 
embedding’ comes in two varieties: 
Actualism or Embedding 
Act 1) Statements about possible entities (events, state of affairs, individuals etc.) 
are made true by abstract actual entities. 
Act 2) Statements about possible entities (events, state of affairs, individuals etc.) 
is talk about possible recombinations of actual entities. 
 
The two versions of actualism have rather obvious drawbacks – version (Act 2) is 
threatened by circularity, and version (Act 1) is saddled with the obscurity of the 
abstract. Yet (Act 1) is almost on the right track, which is, we suggest, the 
following third variety of the actualist strategy: 
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Act 3) Statements about possible entities (events, state of affairs, individuals etc.) 
are made true by indeterminate (‘schematic’) actual entities. 
 
This third, and as far as we know, new version of actualism is a direct 
ontological implementation of the grammatical observation about the symmetry 
between non-specific indefiniteness and irrealis – the grammatical symmetry is 
here taken to indicate that possible events are like non-specific actual entities. 
The guiding intuition underlying (Act 3) might be adumbrated as follows: (i) so-
called ‘possible’ individuals such as a unicorn are in the actual world in the same 
way as ‘general individuals,’ i.e., individuals denoted by NPs with the 
“institutional” (generic) use the definite article, as in: 
(46) The lion is tawny 
(47) The postman delivers the mail 
 
General individuals are functionally defined, thus ‘schematic’ or partially 
indeterminate individuals. (ii) Similarly, the hunting of the pig that would have 
occurred under normal conditions but did not occur, is in the actual world in 
the same way as the denotations of sailing, running and walking in: 
(48) There’s good sailing all along the coast 
(49) Running is more exhausting than walking 
 
The denoted occurrences are again functionally individuated, thus ‘schematic’ or 
partially indeterminate. 
The reasons why ontologists so far have paid little attention to functionally 
individuated entities are, we submit, mainly historical and contingent rather 
than systematic. The ontological tradition has as its central tenet that substances 
or objects are the primary category of basic entities. Substances or objects are 
particular (uniquely located), bounded, countable, concrete individuals – in 
short, ‘thinglike’ entities. The assumption that the ontological domain, the 
world we speak about in natural languages, is most naturally described as an 
assembly of ‘thinglike’ entities, is one of the most important elements of a 
network of presuppositions operative in most historical ontological thought. 
This presuppositional complex, which we call the “Myth of Substance”, can be 
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shown to constrain and direct ontological discussion and theory construction to 
the present day.27 
The popularity of the ‘possibilist’ strategy betrays the virulence of the ‘Myth of 
Substance.’ If one presumes that the most ‘natural’ approach to an ontological 
interpretation of natural language is in terms of thing-like entities or ‘classical 
individuals’, i.e., uniquely and definitely located, bounded, and fully 
determinate individuals, then one will likely assimilate possible entities to such 
classical individuals, in collections of possible classical individuals ‘sitting side 












Possible world W2 
Figure 8. Possibilia as classical individuals 
Similarly, as long as one is in the grip of the presuppositional network of the 
Myth of Substance, only versions (Act 1) and (Act 2) of the actualist strategy will 
come into sight, where possible entities are abstract thing-like entities or thing-
like combinations of thing-like entities. 
Version (Act 3) of the actualist strategy can be recognized as a viable option once 
one abandons the Myth of Substance and rejects the presumption that 
individuality must be understood as implying thing-like existence. In its 
broadest sense, individuality expresses merely distinctness: an individual is a 
something of which we can say ‘this, not that’, something we can distinguish 
from other entities and thus refer to.28 Often distinctness is due to location – 
entities that are uniquely and determinately located and thus distinguishable in 
terms of their location are called ‘particular’ entities, or briefly: particulars, in 
ontology. The distinctness of particulars is a type of distinctness we are well 
familiar with because of its role in ostension, but it is by no means the only type 
of distinctness. For we also can distinguish one entity from another in terms of 
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its function. Stuffs or masses (milk, water, wood) as well as occurrences we 
typically individuate in terms of their functional difference rather than in terms 
of (spatio-temporal) location, as witnessed by: 
(50) ‘What did you do, when she hit you?’ – ‘The same’ 
(51) (Phone conversation) ‘It’s raining cats and dogs here at the moment’ – ‘Just 
the same here’ 
 
Such functionally distinguishable entities, which we call functional individuals, 
can be taken to occur ‘superposed’ in the actual world: 
 
Figure 9. Actual world with ‘superposed’ functional individuals 
Let us now ask to what extent an ontological theory that (i) based on functional 
individuals and (ii) committed to actualism in version (Act 3), can accommodate 
the SDMD. 
11. AN ONTOLOGY OF FUNCTIONAL INDIVIDUALS 
To our knowledge there is currently only one ontological framework that 
combines a commitment to functional individuals with an actualist approach, 
namely, ‘General Process Theory’ (hereafter ‘GPT’).29 For present purposes it will 
suffice to give a rough and informal sketch of some basic ideas and notions of 
GPT. 
In GPT there is only one sort of basic entities, called ‘general processes,’ and 
only one basic generative relation, namely, the ‘is part of’ relation. A general 
process is a non-classical individual: a dynamic, concrete, non-particular entity 
individuated in terms of its functional parts or ingredients. For example, 
walking, running, and snowing are different individuals, since they have 
different ingredients of functional parts: 
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Parts of walking: lifting right leg, lifting left leg, shifting weight, positioning foot on 
ground, pushing forward. 
Parts of running: lifting right leg, lifting left leg, shifting weight, positioning foot on 
ground, pushing forward-and-upward. 
Parts of snowing: group motion of gliding, group motion of rotational tumbling. 
 
According to GPT the set of individuals comprises entities that we common-
sensically classify as occurrences – activities, actions, events, procedures, 
performances etc. – as well as those entities that we commonsensically classify as 
things, persons, features, facts, or situations. Thus being-a-table, being-Max, being-
green, Max’s being 6 feet tall, or the Sprogkollokvium are individuals in GPT. In 
short, according to GPT the domain of f(•L•) consists of nothing else but 
functionally individuated entities of various sorts and complexity. 
Functional individuals occur in many ways in space and time. For our purposes 
here it will suffice to consider three notions of spatio-temporal occurrence, 
which we will introduce here informally as three species of (spatial and/or 
temporal) situatedness. 
 
Figure 10. Types of situatedness in GPT 
Spacetime – and that is: not only geometrical space but also the space of 
common sense reasoning – has a topological description in terms of bounded 
and unbounded regions and a metrical description in terms of places and time 
spells, i.e., intervals defined on co-ordinates that are bounded regions. According 
to type of situatedness, functional individuals can be attributed indefinite or 
definite locations (in space or time): 
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Figure 11. Differently situated individuals 
It is crucially important to note that countability is not restricted to entities with 
definite locations, as the ontological tradition has it. We can count entities not 
only when they occupy different places, i.e., different bounded regions R1 and 
R2, but also when we know that they occupy each some bounded region (and 
that these two regions, wherever they may be, are not connected). 
On the basis of the mentioned distinctions in situatedness we can now 
introduce three classificatory predicates for functional individuals. First the basic 
predicate of being an individual that holds for all basic entities in GPT: 
D0) α is an individual iff α has situatedness 
 
Individuals are concrete, they are somewhere, but they may occur in a unique 
location or distributed over a region (little bits here and there) or, most 
importantly, ‘smeared out’ over a region, that is, simply in a region in an 
unbounded fashion. For example, sentences (52) through (54) denote concrete, 
yet indefinitely located entities (water, music, running): 
(52) Water is going to be a rare commodity in 2050 
(53) Slow music reduces bodily tension 
(54) Running is good for your lungs and bad for your knees 
 
Indefinitely located, non-countable (stufflike) individuals as denoted by 
sentences (52) through (54) are called merely occurrent individuals: 
D1) α is a merely occurrent individual iff α is indefinitely located. 
?
?
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Some functional individuals, though not definitely located, have a type of 
situatedness that allows us to count them: 
D2) α is a quantity of β iff α has the same functional features as β and α 
occupies a bounded region. 
 
For example, sentences (55) and (56): 
(55) Emma did two times ten minutes of biking today 
(56) There are at least three liters of beer in this keg 
 
state that certain quantities of biking and quantities of beer, respectively, occur 
in certain temporal or spatial regions (this day, this keg). A quantity occupies a 
bounded region, otherwise we could not count it, yet it is not determinately 
located in this bounded region. Somewhere twice within the spell of this day a 
ten minute biking event occured, and somewhere in this keg (not ‘next to each 
other’!) there are three liters of beer. 
Other individuals can be counted and occupy a place (i.e. a definite bounded 
region which is also an interval of spatial coordinates). Being in a place is the 
kind of situatedness we are familiar with from classical individuals. 
D3) α is an amount of β iff α has the same functional features as β and α 
occupies a place. 
 
For example, the following sentences denote individuals that are amounts of 
individuals: 
(57) This glass of wine was the best 
(58) Kim saw John at the corner 
(59) Kim’s wedding lasted only ten minutes 
 
Altogether then the class of functional individuals contains three non-
overlapping subclasses of individuals, only two of which contain individuals 
with a type of locatedness that makes them countable30: 
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Figure 12. Types of GPT-individuals 
Let us now put these definitions to use for an ontological interpretation 
(explanation) of the SDMD-explananda, beginning with the GPT rephrasal of the 
actualist postulate (B3) above: 
Act-3-in-GPT 
The actual world consists of collections of concrete, dynamic, non-
particular individuals (‘general processes’) of varying complexity, 
(in)specificity or (in)determinateness, and different types of (in)definite 
locations. The ‘shared world of discourse’ is a collection of processes in 
the actual world. 
 
Given that sentences in the realis and definite NPs denote functional individuals 
that have a definite place in the discourse world, their ontological correlates in 
GPT will be individuals that are amounts of individuals (marking the ontological 
interpretation function by ‘||  ||’): 
(60) ||The farmers killed the pig|| 
= α = Amount of (killing of (amount of being-pig) by (amount of being-
farmer)) 
(61) ||John read the book|| 
= β = Amount of (reading of (amount of being-book) by (amount of being-
John)) 
 
Also specific indefinite NPs are assigned amounts as ontological correlate: 
(62) ||John was reading a book when I came in|| 
= γ = Amount of (reading of (amount of being-book) by (amount of being-
John))... 
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In contrast, the ontological correlates of sentences in the irrealis and non-
specific indefinite NPs are (actual!) individuals without definite location, that is, 
merely occurrent individuals as defined in (D1), or quantities as defined in (D2). 
If there are no grammatical or contextual restrictions on location, the 
ontological correlates are merely occurrent individuals, e.g., the occurrence 
(‘types’) reading, being a book, wanting, or being a dog in (63) and (64), 
respectively: 
(63) ||if John only read a book sometime!|| 
 = δ = reading of (being-book) by amount of (being-John) 
(64) ||John wants a dog|| 
 = η = Amount of (wanting (being-dog) by (amount of being-John)) 
 
Whenever the sentence frame or the context introduce spatial or temporal 
boundaries, thus restricting the indefinite location to certain bounded regions, 
as in sentences (65) and (66), the ontological correlates are quantities: 
(65) ||John would have read the book if he had not taken ill|| 
 = ε = quantity of (reading of (amount of being-book) by (amount of being-
John)) 
(66) ||John is asking for a cup|| 
 = θ = Amount of (asking for (quantity of (being-cup) by (amount of being-
John)) 
 
GPT allows us in this way to create an ‘ontological mirror image’ of sorts for the 
above highlighted discourse-pragmatic similarity of realis and definite NPs on 
the one hand, and of irrealis and non-specific indefinite NPs on the other hand. 
To state the assignment rules that generate the illustrations (60) through (66) 
just given: 
R1) The ontological correlates of specific definite NPs, indefinite NPs, and 
clauses in the realis are amounts of individuals. 
R2) The ontological correlates of non-specific indefinite NPs and clauses in 
the irrealis are merely occurrent individuals or quantities of individuals. 
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With these assignment rules the inferential the SDMD-explananda are easily 
accounted for. Consider again explananda (E1.1) and E1.2): 
E1.1) Clauses with definite NPs and clauses in the realis license existential 
generalizations. 
E1.2) Clauses with non-specific indefinite NPs and clauses in the irrealis, 
respectively, license negated identity statements involving the NP in its 
definite form and the clause in the realis, respectively. 
 
The existential generalization in (E1.1) has the force of ‘there is one, countable, 
determinately placed entity’, which is implied by (R1) and the definition of an 
amount of an individual (D3) above. (E1.2) can be traced to the fact that the 
ontological correlates in question, quantities or merely occurrent individuals, 
differ from amounts. Also the coding principles: 
E2.1) An indefiniteness marker should be used when introducing a NP into the 
discourse. 
E2.2) Indefiniteness markers can be used to denote grounded and ungrounded 
entities. 
 
appear well-motivated on the suggested interpretation. Indefinite NPs (a meeting, 
a book) may denote all three: ‘mere’ indefinitely located individuals (meeting, 
being a book), quantities (a meeting of two hours, a book in this room), or 
amounts (our meeting this morning, the book I just pointed at), and it makes 
good sense to use a linguistic coding that signals a range of ontological 
alternatives, an ‘ontological disjunction’ as it were, before the sentential context 
establishes which alternative is relevant. The grounding principle: 
E3.1) Realis and specific indefinite NPs ‘ground themselves’ directly, without 
sentential embedding or discourse embedding 
 
follows directly from (R1) and a reading of grounding as having definite location 
or being placed – the reading that naturally fits the sense of the existential 
generalization in (E1.1) just mentioned. Finally, consider the anti-symmetry of 
realis and definite NPs, which is manifested in the inferential symmetry 
E1.3) Clauses with definite NPs, and clauses in the irrealis, respectively, license 
identity statements across time, or across modal contexts, respectively, 
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and the related grounding principle: 
E3.2) There are many ways to ground an NP and many ways to unground a 
sentence, turning it into an irrealis. 
 
On the suggested ontological interpretation in terms of actual functional 
individuals these two principles do not directly follow from (R1) or (R2), but 
within an ontology of functional individuals such as GPT they appear well 
motivated at least. That definite NPs and irrealis display at all the communalities 
mentioned in (E1.3) and (E3.2) can be traced to the fact that some forms of re-
identification require that we focus on features of location (across time and 
space), while others require that we focus on functional features only (across 
modal contexts). In order to prep a functional individual for re-identification 
across time and space, it must be definitely localized; in order to prep a 
functional individual for re-identification across modal contexts, it must 
conversely be ‘stripped’ of such definite situatedness. If both NPs and clauses are 
interpreted as functional individuals, the ontology itself already prefigures such 
flexibility in focus (‘localization’ vs. ‘functionalization’ of a feature) as required 
by various types of re-identification – the grounding and ungrounding of both 
NPs and clauses is in each case a matter of specifying or despecifying location 
(localizing or functionalizing a feature).31 In this connection it is important to 
note that in our view localization in a definite place must not be understood as 
implying causal contact. In the suggested actualist setting fictional and 
imaginary entities denoted by definite NPs or the realis (e.g., the denotation of 
Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker St. or John searches the holy grail) are as definitely 
localized as denotations of definite NPs and clauses in the realis that are non-
imaginary or non-fictional – the only difference is that the latter are, by the 
participants of a discourse, agreed to stand in direct causal relationships amongst 
themselves and with discourse participants.32 
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25; 1990: 178), Lefebvre (1998: 94, 99), Baker and Travis (1997). 
2 Abbreviations: 3 = third person, A = adjective, ALLAT = allative, ABS = absolutive, ASP = 
aspect, CLF = classifier, COUNTERF = counterfactual, DEM = demonstrative, DET = 
determiner, DS = different subject, EXH = exhortative, FUT = future, HORT = hortative, 
IMP = imperative, INF = infinitive, IRR = irrealis, N = noun, NEG = negative, NONFUT 
= nonfuture, NP = noun phrase,  num = numeral, PERF = perfective, PL = plural, PRES = 
present, PROH = prohibitive, R = realis, REM.PAST = remote past, RSM = resumptive 
marker, SG = singular, SIM = simultaneous. 
3 The division between the descriptive and interpersonal function corresponds more or 
less to information specified at the representational and the interpersonal level in 
Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld 2004a, 2004b). Note, however, that we use 
‘interpersonal’ in a more restricted sense in that it refers to the pragmatic status of 
entities in the world of discourse. In Halliday’s grammar the interpersonal component 
(‘clause as exchange’) mostly serves to express social relations (see Butler 2003 for a 
detailed comparison of Dik’s Functional Grammar (Dik 1997), Hengeveld’s Functional 
Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld 2004, Hengeveld & Mackenzie forthcoming), Van 
Valin’s Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin & La Polla 1997) and Halliday’s Systemic 
Functional Grammar (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004)). 
4 Rijkhoff (2004 and forthcoming) proposes a separate descriptive layer inside the 
quality layer to accommodate what we might call classifying modifiers (cf. Halliday 
and Matthiessen 2004: 311-335) such as urban in urban hero, Liverpool in Liverpool accent 
or social in social security (see also Quirk et al. 1985: 1339f, Chappell and McGregor 
1989). 
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5 Notice that Zande [dem A N num], Berbice Dutch Creole, Bislama, Sranan [num A N 
dem] and Sango [A N num dem] all constitute counter examples to Hawkins’s claim 
that the adjective never precedes the head when the demonstrative or numeral follow 
(Universal 20’). 
6 The reverse direction of development has been proposed by Frajzyngier (1977) for 
Chadic and Mithun (1988) for a number of North American languages. 
7 A relationship between interpersonal modifiers in the NP and the clause is also attested 
in e.g. Rapanui and Koasati. Rapanui he is used to mark both ‘indefinite action’ (-tense) 
and nonspecificity (Du Feu 1987, 1989, 1996). Koasati has five ‘article suffixes’. These 
suffixes serve to “locate a noun in time and indicate that it was previously 
mentioned”: -:sáya ‘the aforesaid’, -:yólli ‘the very’, -:ka ‘the long ago’, -:kítta ‘the 
former’, and -o:to ‘the deceased; the long ago’ (Kimball 1991: 405). Four of these are 
identical to the participial suffixes (-:sáya ‘present participle’, -:yólli ‘habitual 
participle’, -:ka ‘preterite participle’, and -:kítta ‘imperfect participle’). There is no 
participial suffix corresponding to -o:to, nor is there an article corresponding to the 
future participle. See Nordlinger & Sadler (2004) for a recent discussion of 
aspect/tense/mood marking on nominals. 
8 There is no consensus on the status of specificity as an independent grammatical 
category (von Heusinger 2002a). For some it is, whereas for others specificity is a 
subcategory of ‘indefinite’. 
9 This is not the place to discuss the status of referents, i.e. whether speakers refer to 
entities in the external, physical world or to mental representation of entities that exist 
in the/a world of discourse. For the sake of the argument we will simply assume that in 
a normal conversation speaker and hearer set up a shared world of discourse in which 
realis clauses are used to refer to events that are deemed to have a correlate in the 
external, physical world and in which irrealis clauses are used to refer to events that 
may or may not have a counterpart in the external world. See sections 8-11 for more 
discussion of the ontological aspects of these issues. 
10 Perhaps it is good to emphasize that both the realis/irrealis distinction and the 
definite/indefinite distinction are also relevant for languages in which these 
grammatical notions are not expressed by special markers in the NP or clause. For 
example, in many languages definiteness is marked through syntax (e.g. first position 
in the clause), phonology or morphology (e.g. case marker on the NP or cross-
referencing morphology on the verb). To give an example of phonological marking, in 
Ossetic definiteness was indicated by shifting the stress to the second syllable 
(probably due to the incorporation of an erstwhile definite article, cf. Abaev 1964: 12). 
Schroeder (1999: 40-45) offers a detailed overview of the ways in which definiteness is 
coded in the Turkish language (which has no definite article). 
11 As we will see in section 7, the use of yet is due to referents of indefinite NPs with 
specific reference, e.g. I saw a dog. Once the specific referent of a dog has been 
introduced in the world of discourse, it will have a certain place in that world of 
discourse. On the other hand, once the referent of a nonspecific-indefinite NP has 
been introduced in the world of discourse, it will exist in that world of discourse, but it 
does not occupy a particular spatio-temporal region in that world of discourse (e.g. a 
dog in I want a dog, when any dog will do, no dog in particular is being referred to). 
12 Reiterated in Rijkhoff (2002: 234 fn. 31); see also Harder (1996: 280) and Baker and 
Travis (1998: 242). 
13 Notice that nonspecificity and irrealis tend to co-occur in certain contexts, e.g. in the 
imperative: Give me a spoon!. 
14 Cf. Von Heusinger (2002a: 2): “[...] specificity […] is […] to be characterized as the 
property of an NP being referentially anchored”. 
15 The difference between referents of specific and nonspecific-indefinite NPs may also 
have to do with the fact that in the case of nonspecific reference we need to set up 
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separate discourse worlds for the various interlocutors (rather than having just one 
shared world of discourse for both speaker and hearer; cf. Kamp 2004). 
16 See also Palmer (1986: chapter 6) on modality and other categories. 
17 A note for philosophers: The conception of ontology we endorse is inspired by 
Carnap’s idea of a metaphysically neutral investigation into possible structuralizations 
of the ‘world of experience’ in the loosely Kantian sense that contrasts with ‘reality-in-
itself’. Unfortunately the terms ‘ontology’ and ‘metaphysics’ are frequently used 
interchangeably. We follow what we believe is the historically informed usage where 
the term ‘metaphysics’ is reserved for the inquiry into the relationship between the 
‘world of experience’ (the ‘external, physical’ world, as well as feelings, moods, 
impressions, and thoughts language users take themselves to be interacting with) and 
‘reality-in-itself’ (e.g., as described by science). Ontology, on the other hand, is the 
enterprise of exploring possible categorizations (i.e., structural descriptions) of the 
world of experience without adjudicating the latter’s metaphysical status in the 
‘idealism-realism’ controversy as ‘mere construction’ or ‘causally founded construction’ 
or ‘the only reality we can reasonably talk about’ etc. 
18 For details compare Seibt (2000). 
19 We omit here consideration of the ‘de dicto’ reading of (33). 
20 The use of variables in these examples is to highlight that the inferred possibility of re-
encounter is not due to the lexical meaning of particular NPs or clauses. 
21 Note that common introductions do not make explicit reference to grounded and non-
grounded NPs – this is a characterization we supply. 
22 As witnessed by the development of Discourse Representation Theory, and recent 
variants thereof, at least some formal semanticists have answered this question ‘no,’ for 
reasons that are partly unrelated to the difficulty highlighted here. 
23 Cf. Grim (1984), (1986), Bringsjord (1985). 
24 Cf. Menzel (1996). 
25 Cf. Nolt (1985). 
26 Cf. Plantinga (1989) and Armstrong (1997). 
27 Cf. Seibt (1990, 1996, 2005). 
28 Cf. Strawson (1959). 
29 Seibt (2004). An ontology based on concrete functional individuals is also envisaged in 
Zemach (1970). There are two further reasons, besides the SDMD, why an ontology 
based on functional individuals should deserve particular interest from the linguist’s 
point of view. (1) The order of embedding of descriptive modifiers in the layered 
model (cf. p. 3 above), and in particular the fact that location and quantity modifiers 
operate on quality modifiers can be taken as an indication that the primary denotation 
of clause and NP should not be modeled ontologically as a (thing-like) classical 
individual, but as a functional individual, i.e., as something that is not ‘prepackaged’ 
into countable units. (2) If linguistic evidence for ‘localism’ suggests that spatial 
metaphors are used to express temporal and other non-spatial relations, the ways for a 
concrete entity to exist in space must be diverse enough to support a sufficiently large 
number of conceptual metaphors. Classical individuals exist in only one way in space, 
namely, by having a unique, bounded location. In contrast, functional individuals 
exist in many ways in space: by having a unique, bounded location (occurring in a 
place) but also by having unbounded location (occurring in a region), and by having 
multiple locations (being spatially recurrent). For example, a functional individual like 
water or snowing can occur in a place (bounded, unique location: an amount (portion) 
of water or snowing), or in a region (unbounded location: a quantity – This bowl of 
water contains at least 1 liter of water), or can be spatially recurrent (All guests had wine 
for dinner). 
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30 Note that the GPT predicate ‘x is an amount of y’ does not ensure that the individuals 
fulfilling it (e.g., the denotation of the first landing on the moon) are determinate in all 
their features, like classical individuals. This additional requirement is met by 
individuals that fulfill the GPT-predicate ‘x is a portion of y.’ 
31 The fact that a clause but not an NP can ground itself (that the NP requires the context 
of a clause to do so) might seem to militate against the idea to assign both to NPs and 
clauses as ontological correlates ‘individuals’. To explain why this is so, e.g., in which 
way this can be attributed to the difference in complexity of the correlated individuals 
(my reading a book now vs being this book) is one of the outstanding tasks for the 
suggested ontological interpretation. 
32 GPT lends itself naturally as an ontological framework to be combined with the theory 
of mental spaces and conceptual blending, cf. Fauconnier (1985), Fauconnier and 
Turner (2002). 
